Thread by @Roguski_P, Some thoughts about the #cyberattack against Australia : facts, assessment under international [...]

Some thoughts about the #cyberattack against Australia

: facts, assessment under international law and Australia's response options.
*THREAD*
/1

First, the facts:

state actor (most likely

, but

will not say)

persistent & ongoing campaign

targeted are all levels of gov't, political orgs, OES and other CI operators

systems were penetrated, but no info about disruptive or destructive effects
/2

With this in mind, did this cyber operation breach international law? Let's look at:

use of force

non-intervention

sovereignty
I omit due diligence, because attribution to a state actor is assumed.
/3

It's fairly obvious that there has been no breach of the prohibition of the use of force. Under the scale-and-effects test, which most states (incl.

) use, a cyberattack must be comparable to kinetic operations. As no damage occured, art. 2(4) UNC is not breached.
/4

It's fairly obvious that there has been no breach of the prohibition of the use of force. Under the scale-and-effects test, which most states (incl. ) use, a cyberattack must be comparable to kinetic operations. As no damage occured, art. 2(4) UNC is not breached. /4

Below-the-threshold cyberattacks can constitute a prohibited intervention into the internal affairs of another state if

they are coercive, i.e. deprive the state of the ability to decide or act freely upon matters which

fall within the domaine réservé
/5

Below-the-threshold cyberattacks can constitute a prohibited intervention into the internal affairs of another state ifthey are coercive, i.e. deprive the state of the ability to decide or act freely upon matters whichfall within the domaine réservé/5

Although governmental systems and critical infrastructure were affected, it seems that the actions were not coercive. Penetration of systems and exfiltration of data, without more, does not affect Australia's ability to decide freely on sovereign matters. So, no intervention.
/6

Sovereignty is more tricky. There are 3 approaches:

sovereignty is not a rule of IL and cannot be breached by cyberattacks (

&

DOD)

sovereignty can be breached if there is usurpation of inherently govt functions (TM2.0&

)

penetration = breach of sovereignty (

)
/7

Here,

sovereignty would only be breached under the

approach. As there have been no reports that the penetrated systems and data thereon have been manipulated or destroyed (other than malware installation), this is not enough for usurpation of govt functions.
/8

So far, Australia has not made its own views on sovereignty in cyberspace publicly known, so we don't know how they would assess the cyber attacks. Maybe this would be a good moment to develop a position on this issue.
/9

Next, what are Australia's response options? Lets look at:

criminal indictments

public attribution

sanctions

countermeasures
/10

Unauthorised access to restricted data is an offence under the Australian criminal code and Australia would have territorial jurisdiction. Of course, the perpetrators would first need to be identified, but as a member of the 5 Eyes,

might/should have the capabilities.
/11

Public attribution is a sovereign political decision. Here,

decided not to name the responsible state, but the political calculus might change according to the circumstances. Public attributions are not governed by IL and there is no requirement to provide evidence.
/12

Individual sanctions or cyber restrictive measures can be qualified as retorsions and do not violate IL as long as they do not breach an international obligation owed by

to the sanctioned state. Travel bans & asset freezes are the standard tools here.
/13

Actions that affect

int'l obligations towards the responsible state would constitute an internationally wrongful act and would need to be justified, most likely under the doctrine of countermeasures. For this, a previous wrongful act by the resp. state is necessary.
/14

Here, only a breach of sovereignty under the French penetration-based approach would qualify. Under all other approaches, there has been no breach of sovereignty.
/15

Could

hack back? IMO yes, but the justification and scope varies depending on the approach towards sovereignty.
Under

- yes, because there is no rule of sovereignty to be breached.
Under

- yes, provided no phys. effects or usurpation of inherently govt functions.
/16

Under

- yes, as a countermeasure to induce the responsible state to stop, provided proportionality and other requirements are met. Many states argue that in the cyber context, prior notification is not required if it would jeopardise the success of the countermeasure.
/17

Under - yes, as a countermeasure to induce the responsible state to stop, provided proportionality and other requirements are met. Many states argue that in the cyber context, prior notification is not required if it would jeopardise the success of the countermeasure./17

And that's it. Let's see how this thing develops and how the cyber attacks will affect Australia's position on IL (esp. sovereignty) in cyberspace, if at all.
Thanks for reading! Now I'm going back to grading exams *sigh*.
All copied text from here: https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html
/END

There's a typo (flagpo?) in this tweet:
Of course I meant the French approach. https://twitter.com/Roguski_P/status/1273936037652451328

https://twitter.com/Roguski_P/status/1273936037652451328

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