Read on Twitter
1/ This is is generally a good piece of analysis from @ewong @stevenleemyers @nytimes, include great quotes from @ryanl_hass. But this one paragraph reflects some of the worst journalistic traits of the Trump era:
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/world/asia/us-china-trump-xi.html?referringSource=articleShare MN
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/25/world/asia/us-china-trump-xi.html?referringSource=articleShare MN
2/ “The relationship might not change course even if former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. defeats Mr. Trump in November. The idea of orienting American policy toward competition with China has had robust bipartisan support over the last three-and-a-half years.”
3/ I’m picking on this because it’s a very common, oh-so-smart take, but it’s really whataboutism, a normalization of the unacceptable in American politics, and an acceptance that Trump is actually doing what he claims to be doing — in this case, being “tough on China.”
4/ Sure, there has been a broad shift on China since 2016 (though not as universal as sometimes asserted —especially, as @EvanFeigenbaum has helpfully demonstrated, outside of DC). Neither a Biden Administration nor a Trump second term will return to end-Obama policies.
5/ But that’s about as instructive as saying that neither Biden nor Trump will return to Obama policies on policing or healthcare. There have been changes of fact and perception and will inevitably be changes in policy, but between Trump and Biden they would be very different.
6/ Let’s compare. For starters, @realDonaldTrump does not have a China policy. He has several incomplete China policies, each of which is appalling and, which taken together in their incoherent whole, are incredibly dangerous to the US:
7/ a. There is Trump’s personal simpering sycophancy to autocrats like Xi.
b. The Trump family’s undisguised corruption in pursuit of commercial advantage in China.
c. A trade war managed by people who don’t understand the tools (tariffs) or objectives (fake purchase promises).
b. The Trump family’s undisguised corruption in pursuit of commercial advantage in China.
c. A trade war managed by people who don’t understand the tools (tariffs) or objectives (fake purchase promises).
8/ d. Regular attacks on the actual sources of US strength in any competition with China, including our Alliances, higher education system, welcome of immigrants, democracy.
9/ e. And finally, the new Cold War fear mongering from the likes of @SecPompeo which makes such little sense from a foreign policy perspective (does anyone really think he’s talking to potential Allies or Chinese dissidents?)...
10/ that it can only be understood as an effort to create an external enemy to justify Trump’s authoritarianism.
11/ These “policies” may seek to take advantage of a bipartisan change of view on China, but they do not reflect them. They are, rather, examples of incompetence and corruption — both financial corruption and an effort to corrupt our democracy.
12/ Compare this @TheDemocrats’ platform on China. It’s worth reading in full, but here are a few key points:
https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2020-07-21-DRAFT-Democratic-Party-Platform.pdf
https://www.demconvention.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2020-07-21-DRAFT-Democratic-Party-Platform.pdf
13/ “Democrats’ approach to China will be guided by America’s national interests and the interests of
our allies, and draw on the sources of American strength—the openness of our society, the
1dynamism of our economy,
our allies, and draw on the sources of American strength—the openness of our society, the
1dynamism of our economy,
14/ and the power of our alliances to shape and enforce international
norms that reflect our values. Undermining those strengths will not make us ‘tough on China.’ It
would be a gift to the Chinese Communist Party.” Or:
norms that reflect our values. Undermining those strengths will not make us ‘tough on China.’ It
would be a gift to the Chinese Communist Party.” Or:
15/ “confidence to lead
international efforts to push back on malign behavior while also pursuing cooperation on issues
of mutual interest like climate change and nonproliferation and ensuring that the U.S.-China
rivalry does not put global stability at risk.”
international efforts to push back on malign behavior while also pursuing cooperation on issues
of mutual interest like climate change and nonproliferation and ensuring that the U.S.-China
rivalry does not put global stability at risk.”
16/ Importantly, look at the tremendously differences on immigration and higher education.
17/ Now Biden would face real headwinds implementing this agenda, including inherently complex alliance and partner relationships, confidence deficits created or exacerbated by Trump, and very likely a xenophobic domestic opposition.
18/ But these are not two candidates/parties moving together to get “tough on China.”
19/ They are wildly different approaches — one trying to wrestle with a hard set of geopolitical and economic challenges in a disciplined manner, the other trying to manipulate fear of those challenges for personal and partisan gain.
20/ In other words, if @JoeBiden is elected President, our relationship with China will most definitely “change course.”
