Read on Twitter
Seems to me HMG is rehashing an old argument that *used* to have validity: that a hard economic border between NI and GB is a problem for the Good Friday Agreement too (not just NI-ROI).
Problem is: the deed was done, a consent clause was added, and Stormont came back 1/ https://twitter.com/mckinneytweets/status/1303596588779143169
Problem is: the deed was done, a consent clause was added, and Stormont came back 1/ https://twitter.com/mckinneytweets/status/1303596588779143169
There are legitimate criticisms of EU’s behaviour:
1. Ignored unionism/double consent
2. Wilfully mischaracterised GFA
3. Took unnecessarily maximalist position that destabilised NI
Perhaps.
But, a deal was reached and NI has been quiet(ish) 2/
1. Ignored unionism/double consent
2. Wilfully mischaracterised GFA
3. Took unnecessarily maximalist position that destabilised NI
Perhaps.
But, a deal was reached and NI has been quiet(ish) 2/
Again, it’s possible to question EU’s position today:
1. Is it abusing power of Irish protocol to force UK concessions?
2. Is it acting in good faith?
3. Is it abusing strength, demanding too much?
But again, it can hardly be blamed for defending its interests maximally 3/
1. Is it abusing power of Irish protocol to force UK concessions?
2. Is it acting in good faith?
3. Is it abusing strength, demanding too much?
But again, it can hardly be blamed for defending its interests maximally 3/
Truth is, divergence (the whole point of Brexit) makes things difficult in NI.
The backstop/frontstop was the medicine to allow an internationally acceptable hard Brexit, fair or not.
Did it need to be as bitter? Debatable. But we swallowed it & the side effects were minimal 4/
The backstop/frontstop was the medicine to allow an internationally acceptable hard Brexit, fair or not.
Did it need to be as bitter? Debatable. But we swallowed it & the side effects were minimal 4/
The point is, the original argument that the backstop itself threatened the GFA because it trampled on the consent principle no longer works particularly well, because the protocol has a consent clause and unionism hasn’t erupted over the perceived 2019 betrayal 5/
The clause buried within the protocol that allows for unilateral suspension of its provisions only applies, as far as I can see, if there’s been social unrest, riots etc. That hasn’t happened. In fact, Stormont is back up and running 6/
Problem for UK now is that without regurgitating the protocol medicine, the scale of the UK state’s defeat from 2016-2020 might seem too much.
Can Brexiteers allow Brexit to mean an internal economic border AND rule taking? Or an even harder internal border and no FTA at all? 7/
Can Brexiteers allow Brexit to mean an internal economic border AND rule taking? Or an even harder internal border and no FTA at all? 7/
From 2016-20 
dealt itself a bad hand and contrived to play it badly. In 2019, Boris didn’t change the deck, but pulled a confidence trick—and created the space for a potential settlement in which both sides walked away with something. Now it seems we’re back to zero-sum 8/end
dealt itself a bad hand and contrived to play it badly. In 2019, Boris didn’t change the deck, but pulled a confidence trick—and created the space for a potential settlement in which both sides walked away with something. Now it seems we’re back to zero-sum 8/end
