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After 5 years and 3 months of work I finally defended my PhD thesis earlier this week. It was an extremely emotional experience and I am overly happy and proud with the result.
The thesis tells the much neglected story of Jihadis' internal conflict and here's what it is about.
The thesis tells the much neglected story of Jihadis' internal conflict and here's what it is about.
First about the defence. Defending in front of a committee comprised of all my academic idols Olivier Roy, Stéphane Lacroix, Thomas @Hegghammer and Virginie Collombier was in itself rather frightening but also the most incredible way to conclude the research. Thank you!
During these 5 years I have learned a lot and I got to know a great group of people and I am truly grateful for all the help I received along the way. Not least from all the Jihadis that were willing to speak to me and with some I established a relationship.
I was also so fortunate to spend time at the incredible academic institutions @EuropeanUni, @sciencespo and @UniofOxford while being affiliated with great places like @MiddleEastInst (thanks @Charles_Lister) and @ICSR_Centre (thanks @ShirazMaher)
In terms of method, the research relies on six years of digital anthropology within the online Jihadi milieus on (mainly) encrypted platforms where I collected content, observed debates and interacted with Jihadis. It presented a fascinating window into an evolving phenomenon.
In addition, the thesis builds on interviews with Jihadi ideologues, (foreign) fighters, (former) member and analysts. No one gives better insight than the actors themselves! Bonus info: got a real nice jalabiyya in Zarqa on the recommendation from Abu Qatada.
So, the thesis. What is it about?
It starts with the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri in late Feb 2014. Al-Suri, a Jihadi veteran, was a senior figure in Ahrar al-Sham and had been appointed by al-Zawahiri to manage the conflict with IS - the group that ended up killing him.
It starts with the assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri in late Feb 2014. Al-Suri, a Jihadi veteran, was a senior figure in Ahrar al-Sham and had been appointed by al-Zawahiri to manage the conflict with IS - the group that ended up killing him.
Actually, the emerging conflict within the Jihadi movement had already started at the time, but al-Suri's assassination was an early symbol of what was about to come: a conflict fragmenting & polarising the movement to an unprecedented level that severely threatens its cohesion.
Beginning in Syria, the conflict would over the years spread to a total of 9 Jihadi battlefields, result in a large number of episodes of infighting involving a great number of groups in changing combinations and lead to the death of at least 8,000 Jihadis.
At first - after the outbreak of conflict - as many as 15 reconciliation initiatives would be introduced. Not a single one would be successful however. Why? Because the Islamic State didn't accept any judicial authority outside its own group.
Instead the Islamic State would launch an aggressive attack against rivalling Jihadis both in words & in action. Turki al-Binali, al-Adnani, al-Anbari and Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti were some of the most prominent authors legitimising conflict
In response, al-Qaida was left confused about how to respond. Small peeps came from al-Zawahiri, but the real response to IS came from AQ-affiliated ideologues, which had a massive impact on the ground. At the same time, a milieu of online supporters engaged in the polarisation.
From late 2014 the conflict migrated as a result of the Islamic State's expansion outside of Syria. In some places conflict dynamics known from Syria would quickly take form, while in other battlefields it took time. This shows both the importance of local context & intl dynamics
The Islamic State's constant pursuit of local and global Jihadi hegemony continued to be met with hesitance from al-Qaida. The group attempted to promote Mullah Umar as a counter caliph while al-Zawahiri sent a group of senior figures to Syria to manage al-Baghdadi and his gang.
Little did it help however, and instead the Jihadi environment became even more polarised both on the level of groups, fighters, ideologues and online supporters. Even Jihadi milieus in the West started to incorporate this partisan logic.
We see how infighting started to become the norm and institutionalised. Visuals of assassinations/attacks on rivals were published and religious categories legitimising conflict were established: IS making takfir through a focus on al-wala wa-l-bara and AQ defining IS as khawarij
From mid-2016 things started to change slightly however. We still see a plethora of episodes of inter-group infighting, but conflict dynamics also start to internalise within AQ and IS in Syria/Iraq with both groups starting to experience intra-group problems.
The Islamic State would see a growing conflict between two factions - the binaliyya and hazimiyya - with the latter emerging as a fringe element that eventually (but briefly) took control of the group's most powerful institutions.
Al-Qaida would for the second time experience the loss of an affiliate when Jabhat al-Nusra freed itself from its pledge of allegiance to al-Zawahiri when it re-established itself as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This kickstarted a new cycle of intra-Jihadi conflict in Idlib.
All this obviously didn't stop in 2019 just because I had to round up my thesis. 2020 has seen several new episodes of infighting especially in Idlib and in Mali/Burkina Faso while Jihadis also continue to discredit one another online.
So, what's the impact of all this?
In my view, a Jihadi movement that is more fragmented & polarised than ever before. The fratricide has caused a large number of casualties, mutual distrust, diversion from its main objective & normalisation of an otherwise controversial issue.
In my view, a Jihadi movement that is more fragmented & polarised than ever before. The fratricide has caused a large number of casualties, mutual distrust, diversion from its main objective & normalisation of an otherwise controversial issue.
That said, there is still a lot of solidarity out there, preventing the movement from entirely disintegrating and from competitive escalation of violence that might seriously threaten its future existence. For now at least.
Obviously, internal Jihadi conflict has a genealogy that goes further back than 2014. If that is of your interest, it is generally covered here (except for the AQ-AQI-Maqdisi troubles that are included in the thesis): https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ICSR-Report-Polemical-and-Fratricidal-Jihadists-A-Historical-Examination-of-Debates-Contestation-and-Infighting-Within-the-Sunni-Jihadi-Movement.pdf
I owe a large group of people a debt of gratitude. This list is by no means exhaustive, but a special thank to @jeromedrev, @colebunzel, @Charles_Lister, @CruickshankPaul, @CraigAWhiteside, @Hegghammer, @RomainCaillet, @wellesbien, @BokoWatch and @alleyesonjihad.
My biggest appreciation goes to my closest 'colleagues', the one and only shura council: @ajaltamimi, @azelin, @p_vanostaeyen, @pieternanninga, @SimNasr, @DanieleRaineri, @GuyVanVlierden, @AmarAmarasingam, @charliewinter and @MoustafaAyad. Jazakallahu khayran.
