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Ahead of another crucial Brexit week, it's worth stepping back from all the noise and thinking about what has changed over the last few "crucial weeks".
In mid-October, after a lot of fury by the UK, the negotiating teams started working on draft legal texts. This was... (1/n)
In mid-October, after a lot of fury by the UK, the negotiating teams started working on draft legal texts. This was... (1/n)
the single most important development since the negs began in March.
Until then, the EU had argued the parties couldn't do drafting until they reach a broad consensus on policy. This was unsustainable, not least because many disagreements are political, not technical, and
(2/n)
Until then, the EU had argued the parties couldn't do drafting until they reach a broad consensus on policy. This was unsustainable, not least because many disagreements are political, not technical, and
(2/n)
time is in short supply. The EU had expected the UK would move on policy sooner. That didn't happen, and waiting for a political bargain wouldn't have left much time for the actual legal drafting of a treaty running to 500+ pages. Difficult, to say the least.
(3/n)
(3/n)
I understand that this process, lasting over 3 weeks, has led to close to "90%" of the text done in most of the negotiating areas, with a lot of square brackets where further work needs to be done or disagreements are mostly political.
This is good progress, and
(4/n)
This is good progress, and
(4/n)
the negotiators deserve a lot of credit for working round the clock in the conditions of Covid and general uncertainty about what their political masters actually want. Not easy.
Regarding the "big three" - three areas where disagreements are mostly political - that is
(5/n)
Regarding the "big three" - three areas where disagreements are mostly political - that is
(5/n)
level-playing field, fish and governance - there has been some limited progress.
On LPF, the two sides have continued discussions of the substance of respective LPF chapters (subsidies, competition, envi, labour, climate) and their governance.
(6/n)
On LPF, the two sides have continued discussions of the substance of respective LPF chapters (subsidies, competition, envi, labour, climate) and their governance.
(6/n)
The crux of the problem is that the EU insists on making LPF chapters as enforceable as possible (making them subject to binding arbitration + autonomous measures); a position which the UK side, for most part, rejects and sees an impingement on its sovereignty.
(7/n)
(7/n)
The EU, by contrast, argues that, without adequate enforcement, LPF provisions are largely meaningless.
That said, UK position has softened in recent weeks, esp on dispute resolution for state aid, where the UK seems ready to accept arbitration. However, there's still
(8/n)
That said, UK position has softened in recent weeks, esp on dispute resolution for state aid, where the UK seems ready to accept arbitration. However, there's still
(8/n)
a row over a potential UK domestic state aid regulator; what enforcement powers that regulator would have; and what happens if the other side thinks there's a breach.
Meanwhile, on envi/labour/climate, discussions have continued on whether the non-regression clause
(9/n)
Meanwhile, on envi/labour/climate, discussions have continued on whether the non-regression clause
(9/n)
should be subject to binding arbitration.
The EU also wants a "ratchet clause" (if the parties raised their standards in the future, those standards would become a new common floor); a position which the UK continues to reject.
In short, a lot of disagreements on LPF.
(10/n)
The EU also wants a "ratchet clause" (if the parties raised their standards in the future, those standards would become a new common floor); a position which the UK continues to reject.
In short, a lot of disagreements on LPF.
(10/n)
On fish, the two sides are still miles apart. This reflects a philosophical difference between the two sides. In my view, the two mandates don't allow for a technical solution here, and this needs to be resolved politically.
On governance, there's still a dispute over
(11/n)
On governance, there's still a dispute over
(11/n)
whether there should be a single dispute settlement mechanism covering the whole agreement or only a FTA-specific mechanism.
The UK is pushing against the former, which would bring other "standalone aspects" of the relationship into the scope of DRM, incl
(12/n)
The UK is pushing against the former, which would bring other "standalone aspects" of the relationship into the scope of DRM, incl
(12/n)
fisheries, air transport, etc.
At the heart of this disagreement is the EU's ask for "cross-retaliation" (a possibility that if there's a proven breach, the offended party could retaliate across the whole breadth of the relationship, eg tariffs for fish).
(13/n)
At the heart of this disagreement is the EU's ask for "cross-retaliation" (a possibility that if there's a proven breach, the offended party could retaliate across the whole breadth of the relationship, eg tariffs for fish).
(13/n)
In summary, a lot of technical progress in less controversial areas of the negs (goods, services, transport, energy), but still many disagreements on some of the fundamental aspects of the relationship.
A bit of change, but not very much.
(14/n)
A bit of change, but not very much.
(14/n)
FWIW, as I argued a few weeks ago in the Prospect, it seems to me that there's a clear landing zone in sight, but hard to achieve until both sides can claim to have secured their main defensive interests.
Those defensive interests are:
(15/n) https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/economics-and-finance/brexit-analysis-trade-talks-no-deal
Those defensive interests are:
(15/n) https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/economics-and-finance/brexit-analysis-trade-talks-no-deal
(1) the EU feels reassured over its ask on level-playing field;
(2) the UK secures its ask on the sovereign control of its fishing waters, and
(3) both sides are confident over the NI protocol, with Bxl convinced that the arrangements will actually be implemented,
(16/n)
(2) the UK secures its ask on the sovereign control of its fishing waters, and
(3) both sides are confident over the NI protocol, with Bxl convinced that the arrangements will actually be implemented,
(16/n)
and the UK that they will not violate its red lines on state aid (Art 10 of NIP).
There's a clear landing zone for each of these elements, as I set out in the article and in this report from July (!):
(17/n)
https://institute.global/sites/default/files/2020-07/Tony%20Blair%20Institute%2C%20A%20Path%20to%20Brexit%20Agreement%2C%20July%202020.pdf
There's a clear landing zone for each of these elements, as I set out in the article and in this report from July (!):
(17/n)
https://institute.global/sites/default/files/2020-07/Tony%20Blair%20Institute%2C%20A%20Path%20to%20Brexit%20Agreement%2C%20July%202020.pdf
But it's hard to see how these things can fall into place without a political resolution.
And so, I think, the endgame hasn't really begun.
Or, as Beckett would say:
"The end is in the beginning and yet you go on.”
(End)
And so, I think, the endgame hasn't really begun.
Or, as Beckett would say:
"The end is in the beginning and yet you go on.”
(End)
