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<THREAD>The @DeptofDefense is ignoring the danger of inadvertent nuclear war.
Thanks to @RepRickLarsen, other @HASCDemocrats, and their staff, DoD has issued a report on inadvertent escalation.
It's very revealing... but not in a good way. (1/n) https://twitter.com/RepRickLarsen/status/1327309767216402432
Thanks to @RepRickLarsen, other @HASCDemocrats, and their staff, DoD has issued a report on inadvertent escalation.
It's very revealing... but not in a good way. (1/n) https://twitter.com/RepRickLarsen/status/1327309767216402432
My concern is that this report is really about maintaining effective deterrence, not preventing inadvertent escalation.
Of course, maintaining effective deterrent is important! But, even if deterrence is effective, a nuclear war could still break out.
I'll explain. (2/n)
Of course, maintaining effective deterrent is important! But, even if deterrence is effective, a nuclear war could still break out.
I'll explain. (2/n)
The report rightly recognizes the need to “clearly communicate U.S. intentions” [p. 1].
Yet, it only identifies one message: don’t underestimate our resolve or ability to defend our interests.
That's an important message, but insufficient to protect U.S. interests. (3/n)
![The report rightly recognizes the need to “clearly communicate U.S. intentions” [p. 1]. Yet, it only identifies one message: don’t underestimate our resolve or ability to defend our interests. That's an important message, but insufficient to protect U.S. interests. (3/n)](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Em8_dYAXIAI_eRc.png "The report rightly recognizes the need to “clearly communicate U.S. intentions” [p. 1]. Yet, it only identifies one message: don’t underestimate our resolve or ability to defend our interests. That's an important message, but insufficient to protect U.S. interests. (3/n)")
Yet, it only identifies one message: don’t underestimate our resolve or ability to defend our interests.
That's an important message, but insufficient to protect U.S. interests. (3/n)
Preventing a nuclear war could require the U.S. to credibly signal restraint--e.g., that it doesn’t seek to overthrow the regime of a nuclear-armed adversary.
Such dangers--essentially of OVERestimating U.S. resolve--aren’t even acknowledged, let alone addressed. (4/n)
Such dangers--essentially of OVERestimating U.S. resolve--aren’t even acknowledged, let alone addressed. (4/n)
In a similar vein, the report makes clear that escalation could result from “military forces [that] are vulnerable from strategic attack” [p. 1].
Which is true.
But it soon becomes clear that “military forces” really means “U.S. military forces.” (5/n)
![In a similar vein, the report makes clear that escalation could result from “military forces [that] are vulnerable from strategic attack” [p. 1]. Which is true.But it soon becomes clear that “military forces” really means “U.S. military forces.” (5/n)](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Em9AMdDW4AABN49.png "In a similar vein, the report makes clear that escalation could result from “military forces [that] are vulnerable from strategic attack” [p. 1]. Which is true.But it soon becomes clear that “military forces” really means “U.S. military forces.” (5/n)")
Which is true.
But it soon becomes clear that “military forces” really means “U.S. military forces.” (5/n)
Avoiding inadvertent escalation, however, requires BOTH sides to be confident in the survivability of their nuclear forces.
So, how should the U.S. prevent an adversary from wrongly concluding that its nuclear forces were under threat of attack?
The report is silent. (6/n)
So, how should the U.S. prevent an adversary from wrongly concluding that its nuclear forces were under threat of attack?
The report is silent. (6/n)
The final section of the report on “strategic dialogues and crisis communications” is the only one that really engages inadvertent escalation risks. And, here, DoD’s offers some very fair criticism of China, Russia, and--fascinatingly--North Korea. (7/n)
Yet, China and Russia (and I guess North Korea) could reasonably question the value of dialogue absent U.S. willingness to take concrete steps to address their concerns, which has been particularly lacking for the last four years but wasn't always there previously. (8/n)
(Side note: The clear implication here is that the U.S. would be willing to have a dialogue with North Korea on risk reduction, as opposed to denuclearization, if Pyongyang were willing to engage. Color me skeptical…) (9/n)
Given these problems, as I've argued before, I believe that the under secretary of defense for policy should be legally assigned the task of leading departmental efforts to reduce inadvertent escalation risks. (10/n)
Here's the URL for the report: https://larsen.house.gov/uploadedfiles/managing_risks_of_nuclear_escalation.pdf (11/11)
