A bit of precursory information before my tweets come in. As we know, the Germans launched their offensive in the Ardennes on December 16th, and by the 17th virtually all USAAF units in the UK had been made aware of the breakout. However, the severity of the breakout was not /1
yet clear, as indicated by the Group diaries. That said, it presented something potentially exciting for the Groups of IX TCC who had spent most of October and November flying supplies to the front and to the ALG's in generally poor weather. At that stage the Airborne Divs of /2
the XVIIIth Airborne Corps had been withdrawn from combat, with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions stationed in France, and the 17th Airborne Division stationed in England. IX TCC was to begin an extensive period of training with the Abn Divs, practice drops, glider /3
exercises, etc. The primary reason for this was to avoid the mistakes of the past, namely at the time of the invasions of Sicily and Italy in which cooperation between the Airborne forces and Troop Carrier forces was basically non-existent. For NEPTUNE and MARKET that had /4
improved considerably, and despite what some might tell you the miss drops experienced on D-Day were not a result of inadequate training. BUT it was necessary to keep aircrew and Airborne alike sharp, and prepared. The situation along the Western Front in Europe made it an /5
ideal time to carry out weeks, perhaps months of training.

When the severity of the German Offensive became clear, the prospect of the Airborne Divisions being pulled from the reserve and sent to the frontlines became very real, and IX TCC were alerted to the possibility /6
that this could well be in the form of a large scale Airborne Operation. As it happened, it was logistically both easier, and quicker, to transport the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions to the Ardennes by road transport.

However, on the 21st the Command began to push forward /7
orders for Operation Repulse.

Repulse encapsulated two primary goals. Each of which was classed as an Emergency Mission, and everything else previously planned/scheduled from there forward was put on hold.

Those two primary goals were A) To provide resupply by air to the /8
101st Airborne Division at Bastogne at the earliest available opportunity, as well as to a task force of the 106th Infantry Division cut off near Marcouray.

B) To air-land the entire 17th Airborne Division to ALG's in France and Belgium, as well as rear echelon elements of /9
the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. From there, they would be sent to the front by road transport.

The reason the 17th Abn Div could not be dropped into battle was simply down to the fluidity of the lines, which were constantly changing, and by the time a mission could be planned, /10
the situation had changed. By using road transport, they could be sent to wherever they were needed.

Operation REPULSE saw the use of Airborne Pathfinders marking DZ's for supplies to be dropped from the air, and delivered by Gliders, and over the anniversary of the Battle /11
of the Bulge I will be tweeting about these missions as well as the missions to air-land the 17th Abn Div.
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