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How to sell conventional deterrence:
A thread for US Marines and anyone else interested in fighting in the Indo-Pacific. /1
A thread for US Marines and anyone else interested in fighting in the Indo-Pacific. /1
Been thinking about this today after reading that the USMC didn't get their tomahawks and learning that most of congress (surprise) doesn't understand importance of conventional in addition to nuclear deterrence.
I won't tell you what comms packages to use or whatever, that's not my area of expertise. However, I will tell you how to translate EABO and conventional deterrence to those who think nukes will save us all.
This isn't the first time we've faced this problem, our conventional forces were hollowed out after Vietnam and the Soviets spent all that time catching up and in some cases surpassing us. Then comes Reagan. Reagan reignited the arms race (on our side).
However, Reagan didn't just greenlight nukes. He helped foster a conventional modernization effort that was practically on life support in the 70s.
The thinking was, if we have nukes and MAD, why do we need conventional forces? That's like deterring a gun with a knife when you also have a gun, right?
Wrong. Any self defense expert will tell you that good defense means multiple forms of defense: guns, knives, fists, etc.
Wrong. Any self defense expert will tell you that good defense means multiple forms of defense: guns, knives, fists, etc.
Understanding escalation is key to understanding nuclear strategy. Not everything, in fact most things, do not demand the threat of nuclear annihilation. Threatening annihilation over everything leads to "boy who cried wolf" type scenarios...or Obama's red line on a smaller scale
So what does this mean in a US-China cold war?
Well, nuke modernization is due this decade and yes it's important. But some modernization is more important than others and some can be shelved. Modernization costs a lot and will eat the conventional budget.
Well, nuke modernization is due this decade and yes it's important. But some modernization is more important than others and some can be shelved. Modernization costs a lot and will eat the conventional budget.
Given what most laypeople and politicians think about nukes (see above), most will choose to vote for mass nuclear modernization when forced to make the false choice of nukes vs conventional.
And that is exactly what happened to the USMC in pursuit of anti-ship missiles to fight China as part of its asymmetric/EABO strategy. Congress didn't understand why that capability mattered relative to nuclear deterrence. So here's why it matters...
I'll make it simple: think of deterrence like a wall. At the top of the wall, you have the pointy spikes: the nukes. These prevent the enemy from overwhelming and climbing the all. The problem is, if the bottom part of the wall is made up of clay instead of steel, it's vulnerable
The strength of the pointy spikes is negated by the weak clay that can be dug through, under, or just worn down. You need a solid wall to deter aggressors, ideally you need layered defense but that's a whole other matter.
The point: if you only fund nukes, or favor nuke modernization over conventional modernization (that has been neglected and mismanaged for two decades) you will be building your defenses without a sturdy base that leaves you compromised.
So when you look at things like a Bradley replacement, ASBMs for the Marines, or even space capabilities and you say "we don't need those, we have nukes" you are cutting out your own legs. You're compromising the very programs that keep the PLA from their objectives.
And this isn't just about the USMC, that's only a symptom of the larger budget fight that is coming. The Navy and Air Force will both have to face these choices in the coming years. The budget isn't getting much bigger for a while. Better start making people understand.
End thread.
