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We have some new analysis up on volatility, realignment and electoral shocks in the context of Brexit and the last election.Click through for the thread
https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/uncategorized/volatility-realignment-electoral-shocks/
The 2019 election has been described as a "Brexit election". But neither it nor Brexit itself occurred in a vacuum. Rather, the rise of the cultural values and the decline of party identification have created conditions ripe for electoral realignment.
In our recent book, Electoral Shocks, we argue that Brexit made socio-cultural issues like immigration more salient and sped this process up.
We ask if we should think of these shifts in electoral allegiances as a temporary blip or a full on realignment in British politics.
We ask if we should think of these shifts in electoral allegiances as a temporary blip or a full on realignment in British politics.
1. Volatility
2019 saw a marked decrease in individual-level volatility in compared to 2017 and 2015. In fact, individual-level volatility is now at a similar to 1997 or 2001.
Support might, thus, be settling into a new (relatively) stable pattern.
2019 saw a marked decrease in individual-level volatility in compared to 2017 and 2015. In fact, individual-level volatility is now at a similar to 1997 or 2001.
Support might, thus, be settling into a new (relatively) stable pattern.
2. Geography
Conservative successes in the "Red Wall" defined 2019. And just as the Conservatives did well in Leave seats, Labour did well in Remain ones. History tells us that a changing geographic basis of support can in itself be indicative of realignment.
Conservative successes in the "Red Wall" defined 2019. And just as the Conservatives did well in Leave seats, Labour did well in Remain ones. History tells us that a changing geographic basis of support can in itself be indicative of realignment.
3. Social Class
2019 saw the class-basis of British politics continue to change. Labour's grip on the working class weakened. Indeed, the class basis of support in Britain looks much different to what it did in the heyday of class politics.
2019 saw the class-basis of British politics continue to change. Labour's grip on the working class weakened. Indeed, the class basis of support in Britain looks much different to what it did in the heyday of class politics.
4. Education
Education was a strong predictor of 2016 Brexit vote and has since become a strong predictor of party choice too.
This is clear for those with no qualifications. In 2015, 49% voted Conservative in the 2-party vote. By 2017 this was 61% and by 2019 74%.
Education was a strong predictor of 2016 Brexit vote and has since become a strong predictor of party choice too.
This is clear for those with no qualifications. In 2015, 49% voted Conservative in the 2-party vote. By 2017 this was 61% and by 2019 74%.
5. Age
Brexit has also heightened the link between age and vote choice. Age was already a strong predictor of Conservative voting in 2015, but this relationship greatly expanded in 2017 and remained similarly strong in 2019.
Brexit has also heightened the link between age and vote choice. Age was already a strong predictor of Conservative voting in 2015, but this relationship greatly expanded in 2017 and remained similarly strong in 2019.
6. Brexit Identities
In an age of party dealignment, one symptom of realignment is the rise of social and political identities. Leave and Remain identities grew following the 2016 vote, peaked between then and 2017, then receded only very slightly in 2019.
In an age of party dealignment, one symptom of realignment is the rise of social and political identities. Leave and Remain identities grew following the 2016 vote, peaked between then and 2017, then receded only very slightly in 2019.
Clearly, Brexit structured the vote in 2019. But while these developments are consistent with the early stages of realignment, it is too early to know if they are a long-term critical realignment.
If these changes are here to stay depends on âculturalâ issues like immigration and minority rights continuing to divide voters after Brexit. If this is the case, Brexit identities might evolve into more general social conservative/liberal identities.
On the other hand, traditional economic issues might return as after-effects of Brexit and COVID-19. EU identities could then evaporate, leading voters to desert the major parties again, resulting in higher levels of electoral volatility.
Which of these futures comes to pass remains to be seen. Ultimately, the only certainty about the future of British politics is that it will be driven by unforeseen events and, thus, by how political actors respond to those events.
(For a more detailed examination of these issues, see the full paper here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764477)
