Read on Twitter
I recommend you read Tarek's excellent thread in its entirety.
Since there's a lot of spin around yesterday's surprise #Libya vote, mine will focus on the how & why behind its results - & a couple implications this has for the new Dbaiba-Mnefi executive. https://twitter.com/Tmegrisi/status/1357750760717615106?s=20
Since there's a lot of spin around yesterday's surprise #Libya vote, mine will focus on the how & why behind its results - & a couple implications this has for the new Dbaiba-Mnefi executive. https://twitter.com/Tmegrisi/status/1357750760717615106?s=20
I won't speculate about the tacit backing of foreign states to the Agila/Bashagha duo, nor will my analysis factor in electoral fraud/dirty money (though it is one).
In my view - within the context of the LPDF, those were not the deciding factors for the contemporary outcome.
In my view - within the context of the LPDF, those were not the deciding factors for the contemporary outcome.
What was far more consequential was the voting framework- there, the magic turned on the magician.
I think we can unequivocally argue the UN's blueprint for a regional-based split of endorsements/votes/lists was meant to reverse-engineer the Agila/Bashagha deal panning out.
I think we can unequivocally argue the UN's blueprint for a regional-based split of endorsements/votes/lists was meant to reverse-engineer the Agila/Bashagha deal panning out.
The rationale behind a power-sharing deal between Agila & Bashagha was blinkered but appealing.
It would appease them, key interest groups behind them & some foreign players - irrespective of their ability to politically converge, jointly govern or act as unifying vectors.
It would appease them, key interest groups behind them & some foreign players - irrespective of their ability to politically converge, jointly govern or act as unifying vectors.
But the attempt to pass this deal by designing a candidacy & voting framework subject to regional segmentation spectacularly backfired.
It was omitted that this would subject the candidacy & voting process to intra-elite divisions, but also append a regional dimension to both.
It was omitted that this would subject the candidacy & voting process to intra-elite divisions, but also append a regional dimension to both.
Of course, the process was peppered with cosmetic attempts at transparency (such as candidate interviews).
Agila's interview caused public outrage & was an omen of how controversial a figure he'd become (even among elites) - a central aspect that influenced subsequent votes.
Agila's interview caused public outrage & was an omen of how controversial a figure he'd become (even among elites) - a central aspect that influenced subsequent votes.
Nevertheless, this went unheeded in designing the lists.
Bashagha & Agila, already aligned, sought out SaifAlNasr & Juwaili, "power-houses" with potential to influence dynamics on the ground - but limited sway inside the LPDF.
To varying degrees, other lists were more cogent.
Bashagha & Agila, already aligned, sought out SaifAlNasr & Juwaili, "power-houses" with potential to influence dynamics on the ground - but limited sway inside the LPDF.
To varying degrees, other lists were more cogent.
Then came the 1st vote - expectedly, the Bashagha/Agila ticket did well. It had the full backing of the JCP & pro-Agila HoR members - both well-represented groups at the LPDF.
Other tickets' performance was dictated by individual candidates' ability to mobilize votes.
Other tickets' performance was dictated by individual candidates' ability to mobilize votes.
Mnefi & Dbaiba's list emerged as a runner-up because their entire campaigning was premised on mobilizing votes from all those that ran on the ticket (Ellafi & Koni were not sideshows), but also chip at the factions whose support Agila & Bashagha would lose by allying together.
The 2nd vote is where it all came crashing down for the Bashagha/Agila duo.
In many ways, this ticket was not designed to mobilize votes outside of the original interest groups backing it. It was a ticket meant to win a majority vote among other lists - not against one.
In many ways, this ticket was not designed to mobilize votes outside of the original interest groups backing it. It was a ticket meant to win a majority vote among other lists - not against one.
To the extent that this eventuality was considered, it was thought that wide enough support within the LPDF fora, coupled with real influence on the ground, would translate into a win as other elites represented by LPDF members would concede, hoping for a piece in the new setup.
But what defines a "pragmatic compromise" is subjective, particularly when it is considered by an amalgam of opportunistic & parochial elite groups whose threat perception were now also filtered through the lenses of intra-regional rifts.
This proved a boon for Mnefi/Dbaiba.
This proved a boon for Mnefi/Dbaiba.
Mnefi/Dbeiba & co secured votes of Eastern anti-Agila figures (they'd voted for Barghathi in round 1), Westerners that opposed Bashagha & his alliance with Agila (they'd voted for Ghweill/Montaser in round 1), & Southerners that opposed SaifAlNasr for his past/allying with Agila.
The irony of fate is that, instead of the LPDF ushering in a "power-sharing" agreement between a dysfunctional group of entrenched elites on the ground, it has now brought a new slightly more cogent but disconnected group that came off the back of discontent with the former.
It's difficult to see how the new executive would assert its influence on the ground without - to a degree - depending on the armed & interest groups opposing those they defeated.
This is why many of the anti-Bashagha factions in Tripolitania overtly celebrated yesterday.
This is why many of the anti-Bashagha factions in Tripolitania overtly celebrated yesterday.
Also, the executive's short mandate is a disincentive for those that lost to consider being co-opted by the winners.
Losers were uncharacteristically quick to concede defeat not out of maturity, but because waiting until December before undermining the new body is tolerable.
Losers were uncharacteristically quick to concede defeat not out of maturity, but because waiting until December before undermining the new body is tolerable.
We're yet to see the government Dbaiba will unveil (he possesses leeway), & the extent to which he will seek to upend the contemporary elite setup - which in turn will dictate both the degree of resistance he may face in the run-up to December, but also after that period elapses.
Anyway, what was envisioned as an intra-elite deal is still just that.
This one's unforeseen contours merely defines new winners/losers & redraws the forthcoming conflict dynamics - but today's outcome is not a win for Libyans hoping for better governance, services or security.
This one's unforeseen contours merely defines new winners/losers & redraws the forthcoming conflict dynamics - but today's outcome is not a win for Libyans hoping for better governance, services or security.
